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ABSTRACT
With increasing popularity of unmanned aircraft, continuous
monitoring of their systems, software, and health status is
becoming more and more important to ensure safe, correct,
and efficient operation and fulfillment of missions. The paper
presents integration of prognosis models and prognostic in-
formation with the R2U2 (REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, and
UNOBTRUSIVE Unit) monitoring and diagnosis framework.
This integration makes available statistically reliable health
information predictions of the future at a much earlier time to
enable autonomous decision making. The prognostic infor-
mation can be used in the R2U2 model to improve diagnostic
accuracy and enable decisions to be made at the present time
to deal with events in the future. This will be an advance-
ment over the current state of the art, where temporal logic
observers can only do such valuation at the end of the time
interval. Usefulness and effectiveness of this integrated diag-
nostics and prognostics framework was demonstrated using
simulation experiments with the NASA Dragon Eye electric
unmanned aircraft.
1. INTRODUCTION
For safe and efficient operation and successful fulfillment of
missions, it is imperative for modern autonomous systems,
such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS), to detect, in flight,
if all their components are working in a nominal mode, or
if there are any faults that might hamper their performance,
endanger their missions, or even lead to crashes. Hence, con-
tinuous monitoring of the UAS systems, their software, and
health status is becoming—even for small UAS—more and
more important.
Traditional Fault Detection and Diagnosis (FDD) systems use
the current system status as provided by on-board sensors to
detect faults and perform root cause analysis. Many differ-
Johann Schumann et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, pro-
vided the original author and source are credited.
ent FDD systems and approaches exist and are being used
for commercial and military aircraft, automobiles, or com-
plex (chemical) plants, e.g., (Frank, 1996). Many diagnostic
reasoners that are used for on-board diagnostics are oblivi-
ous of any temporal relationships and strictly focus on the
current state of the system, or need signal-preprocessing li-
braries (e.g., TEAMS RT (Mathur, Deb, & Pattipati, 1998)).
Other systems like FACT (Karsai et al., 2006) allow the
modeler to specify properties of temporal propagation that
can be used for diagnosis. For example, if component A
fails some time after component B and there is structural
relationship, then the reasoner can deduce from the order
of the events what actually happened. Again, all infor-
mation is deduced from the current and past states of the
UAS. The R2U2 (REALIZABLE, RESPONSIVE, and UNOB-
TRUSIVE Unit) Framework (Schumann, Rozier, et al., 2013;
Schumann et al., 2015; Reinbacher, Rozier, & Schumann,
2014) is a diagnosis framework that combines observers for
Metric Temporal Logic with Bayesian networks for prob-
abilistic reasoning and root cause analysis. R2U2 is im-
plemented in FPGA hardware (Geist, Rozier, & Schumann,
2014).
The performance and safety of an electrically powered UAS
strongly depends on its battery. In most cases, high-powered
rechargeable cells (e.g., Li-poly type cells) are used to power
engines, electronics, and payload. When the battery gets de-
pleted, its voltage starts decreasing and available power to the
engine might be reduced. This can lead to lower speeds and
climb rates. If the voltage drops below a certain threshold, the
flight computer will stop and the UAS will crash. Prognostic
information that gives a prediction of how much time remains
before the battery voltage will drop below a certain threshold
can be very valuable in such scenarios, ensuring even safer
operation by enabling possible mitigation actions.
In this paper, we extend R2U2 to incorporate the use of prog-
nostic models and reasoning information to take future pre-
dictions of safety and performance into account. This en-
ables decision making at the present point in time. With this
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extension, we are able to substantially improve model ex-
pressiveness with respect to future events. For example, a
safety rule might say that “the UAS state is only healthy if an
upcoming climb is performed with enough battery reserves
when the climb starts”. Assuming that the flight plan entails
a climb in 10 minutes, a temporal encoding of that flight rule
could be: “within the next 10 minutes always have a good
battery.” However, the validity of this formula can only be
established after 10 minutes, unless the battery becomes de-
pleted before that. That time, however, in general is too late
to re-plan the mission. The synchronous R2U2 observers pro-
vide additional instantaneous information if it is still possible
(“maybe”) to observe the flight rule, but again, its ultimate
validity can only be decided after 10 minutes. Our proposed
extension allows for such a flight rule to be evaluated at the
current time indicating if the battery will be good in 10 min-
utes.
With our novel incorporation of prognostics reasoning into
the R2U2 framework, we will have information about the ex-
pected future battery performance at the present time, and the
system can decide immediately if the flight rule will be vio-
lated in the future based upon these predictions. Obviously,
assumptions about the battery performance and the estimated
load profile are necessary. Using simulation experiments with
the NASA Dragon Eye unmanned aircraft we will demon-
strate how the use of an advanced prognostics model for the
main UAS battery can augment and improve the UAS health
models.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents an overview of the R2U2 framework with tempo-
ral observers and Bayesian reasoning and its realization in
FPGA hardware. This section also gives an introduction into
our model-based prognostics architecture. Section 3 focuses
on the integration of prognostic reasoning into R2U2. In
Section 4 we present results of simulation experiments with
a NASA UAS and a prognostics model for battery perfor-
mance. Section 5 discusses future work and concludes this
paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section we present an overview over the R2U2 frame-
work with its FPGA implementation and provide an introduc-
tion into prognostics.
2.1. The R2U2 Framework
Developed to continuously monitor system and safety proper-
ties of an UAS in flight, our real-time R2U2 (REALIZABLE,
RESPONSIVE, and UNOBTRUSIVE Unit) framework has been
implemented on FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array)
hardware (Reinbacher et al., 2014; Geist et al., 2014). Health
models within this framework (Schumann, Rozier, et al.,
2013; Schumann et al., 2015) are defined using Metric Tem-
[2,6]p 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p p p p p
♦[0,7]p 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p
pU[1,5]q 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p p q
pR[3,8]q p,q0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
qqq
Figure 1. Illustration of MTL operators (from (Schumann,
Rozier, et al., 2013)). Time steps and interval boundaries refer
to ticks of the system clock.
poral Logic (MTL) and Mission-time Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) (Reinbacher et al., 2014) for expressing temporal prop-
erties as well as Bayesian Networks (BN) for probabilistic
and diagnostic reasoning.
R2U2 models are constructed in a modular way where out-
puts of sensor discretization and reasoning components can
be connected to other monitoring and reasoning components
(Schumann, Rozier, et al., 2013). An R2U2 model is usually
specified using a graphical block representation and consists
of data processing blocks, temporal logic observer blocks,
and Bayesian diagnostic reasoning blocks. Additional block
types provide utility functions.
2.1.1. Temporal Logic Monitors
LTL and MTL formulas consist of propositional variables,
the Boolean operators ∧, ∨, ¬, or →, and MTL oper-
ators. For formulas p, q, we have p (ALWAYS p), ♦p
(EVENTUALLY p), Xp (NEXTTIME p), pUq (pUNTIL q),
and pRq (pRELEASES q). For MTL, each of the temporal
operators is accompanied by an upper and lower time bound
that express the time period during which the operator must
hold. Figure 1 illustrates the MTL operators: [2,6]p means
that p must be true at all times between time step 2 and 6
along the time line (red dots). ♦[0,7]p means that p must be
true at least once in the interval [0, 7]. In Figure 1, p is true at
t = 7 making that formula true. pU[1,5]q signifies that either
q is true at the beginning of the interval, or else p is true at the
beginning of the interval and will remain true until a future
time (here: t = 3) within the interval, when q must be true
(blue dot). Finally, pR[3,8]q means that either p ∧ q is true
at the beginning of the interval or q is true then until a fu-
ture time within the interval when both are true (purple dot at
t = 6 in Figure 1). This operator is works like a push-button:
pressing p triggers event ¬q that “releases q” in the future. A
detailed definition and semantics can be found in (Reinbacher
et al., 2014).
2.1.2. Bayesian Networks for Health Models
In many situations, temporal logic monitoring might come
up with several violations of properties. In order to be able
to disambiguate the root causes, the R2U2 framework uses
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Figure 2. BN for Health management. Observable nodes are
shaded.
static Bayesian Networks (BN) for diagnostic reasoning. BNs
are directed acyclic graphs, where each node represents a sta-
tistical variable (Figure 2). BNs are well-established in the
area of diagnostic and health management (e.g., (Pearl, 1985;
Mengshoel et al., 2010)). Conditional dependencies between
statistical variables are represented by directed edges. Local
conditional probabilities are stored in the Conditional Prob-
ability Table (CPT) of each node. For example, the CPT of
node S in Figure 2 defines P (S|U,H S).
For our health models, we are using BNs of a general struc-
ture as shown in Figure 2. Discrete sensor signals or out-
puts of the synchronous temporal observers (true, false,
maybe) are clamped to the S (sensor) and C (command)
nodes. Since a sensor can fail, it has an unobservable health
node attached.1 As priors, these health nodes can contain in-
formation on how reliable the component is, e.g., by using a
Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) metric. Unobservable nodes,
U , may describe the behavior of the system or component as
it is defined and influenced by the sensor or software infor-
mation. For details of modeling see (Schumann, Mbaya, et
al., 2013).
During flight, the posterior probabilities of the BN’s health
nodes, given the sensor and command values e as evidence
are calculated at each time step. The probability Pr(H S =
good|e) gives an indication of the status of the sensor or com-
ponent. For on-board real-time reasoning, we use a represen-
tation of BNs that is based upon arithmetic circuits (AC), as
these data structures and algorithms provide predictable real-
time performance (Chavira & Darwiche, 2005; Mengshoel et
al., 2010).
2.2. Hardware Implementation
R2U2 is implemented as a separate hardware component.
Figure 3A shows the high-level architecture of R2U2 inte-
grated in a UAS. Controlled by an on-board flight computer
and the flight software (FSW), the UAS receives measure-
ments from various sensors (e.g., inertial sensors, GPS, or
barometric altitude) and commands from the ground control
station (GCS) and calculates the necessary adjustments of the
actuators: elevator, rudder, ailerons, and throttle. Our R2U2
monitor obtains information from sensors and the FSW. In-
strumentation of the FSW with small footprint (Geist et al.,
1In contrast, am command input cannot fail and there for does not have an
associated health node.
2014; Schumann, Rozier, et al., 2013) guarantees minimal
obtrusiveness of our framework. All monitoring data are
transferred via a read-only interface into our R2U2 imple-
mentation that is hosted on an Adapteva Parallella board2
mounted on the UAS.
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Figure 3. A: High level system architecture with R2U2. B:
FPGA architecture.
Figure 3B shows the major components of the R2U2 monitor-
ing unit as implemented in the FPGA: the control subsystem,
the signal processing and filtering system (SP), the runtime
verification (RV) unit, and the runtime reasoning (RR) unit.
Continuous signals as obtained via the read-only interface
are filtered and discretized in the SP unit to obtain streams
of propositional variables. The RV and RR units comprise
the proper health management hardware: RV monitors MTL
properties using pairwise observers defined and proved cor-
rect in (Reinbacher et al., 2014). After the temporal logic
formulas have been evaluated, the results are transferred to
the runtime reasoning (RR) subsystem, where the compiled
Bayesian network is evaluated to yield the posterior marginals
of the health nodes (Geist et al., 2014).
2.3. Prognostics
In this section we discuss our developed electro-chemical
model and battery prognosis framework following the gen-
eral estimation-prediction framework of model-based prog-
nostics (Luo, Pattipati, Qiao, & Chigusa, 2008; Orchard &
Vachtsevanos, 2009; Daigle & Goebel, 2013). Details of
the specific algorithms are described in (Daigle & Kulka-
rni, 2013). Similar approaches have been used for prog-
nosis of pneumatic valves (Daigle, Kulkarni, & Gorospe,
2014; Kulkarni, Daigle, Gorospe, & Goebel, 2014) and for
Current/Pressure (I/P) Transducers (IPT) (Teubert & Daigle,
2013, 2014) Here, we only summarize the formulation of the
prognostics problem, followed by a brief description of the
estimation and prediction approach.
2http://www.adapteva.com/parallella-board/
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2.3.1. Problem Formulation
We assume the system model may be generally defined as
x(k + 1) = f(k,x(k),θ(k),u(k),v(k)),
y(k) = h(k,x(k),θ(k),u(k),n(k)),
where k is the discrete time variable, x(k) ∈ Rnx is the
state vector, θ(k) ∈ Rnθ is the unknown parameter vector,
u(k) ∈ Rnu is the input vector, v(k) ∈ Rnv is the process
noise vector, f is the state equation, y(k) ∈ Rny is the output
vector, n(k) ∈ Rnn is the measurement noise vector, and h
is the output equation.3
In prognostics, we predict the occurrence of an event E that
is defined with respect to the states, parameters, and inputs
of the system. We define the event as the earliest instant that
some event threshold TE : Rnx × Rnθ × Rnu → B, where
B , {0, 1} changes from the value 0 to 1. That is, the time
of the event kE at some time of prediction kP is defined as
kE(kP ) , inf{k ∈ N : k ≥ kP ∧ TE(x(k),θ(k),u(k)) = 1}.
The time remaining until that event, ∆kE , is defined as
∆kE(kP ) , kE(kP )− kP .
For system health management, TE is defined via a set of per-
formance constraints that define what the acceptable states of
the system are, based on x(k), θ(k), and u(k) (Daigle &
Goebel, 2013). For batteries, we are interested in end of dis-
charge (EOD) time, i.e., the time at which the battery voltage
will deplete below the voltage threshold VEOD.
Models of the system components are constructed in this
paradigm that capture both nominal behavior, as well as
faulty behavior and damage progression. Using these mod-
els, observations can be mapped back to the health state of
the system as represented in x and θ. An estimation algo-
rithm, such as the Kalman filter (KF), unscented Kalman fil-
ter (UKF), or particle filter (PF), is used to solve this prob-
lem (Daigle, Saha, & Goebel, 2012). In this paper we use the
UKF. This state-parameter estimate, along with a prediction
of the future usage of the component, is used as input to a pre-
diction algorithm that computes the time to EOD. This time is
known as end of life (EOL), the difference between EOL and
current time is called the remaining useful life (RUL) (Daigle
& Goebel, 2013; Daigle, Saxena, & Goebel, 2012).
2.3.2. Prognostics Architecture
In our model-based prognostics architecture (Daigle &
Goebel, 2013), there are two sequential problems, (i) the
estimation problem, which requires determining a joint
state-parameter estimate p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)) based on
the history of observations up to time k, y(k0:k), and
3Bold typeface denotes vectors, and na denotes the length of a vector a.
(ii) the prediction problem, which determines at kP ,
using p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)), a probability distribution
p(kE(kP )|y(k0:kP )). The distribution for ∆kE can be
trivially computed from p(kE(kP )|y(k0:kP )) by subtracting
kP .
The prognostics architecture is shown in Figure 4. In discrete
time k, the system is provided with inputs uk and provides
measured outputs yk. The estimation module uses this infor-
mation, along with the system model, to compute an estimate
p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)). The prediction module uses the joint
state-parameter distribution and the system model, along with
hypothesized future inputs, to compute the probability distri-
bution p(kE(kP )|y(k0:kP )) at given prediction times kP .
2.3.3. Estimation
For batteries a detailed physics model of component behav-
ior using nominal data from the testbed has been developed,
which is discussed in (Daigle & Kulkarni, 2013). We use
an unscented Kalman filter (UKF) to obtain the state esti-
mate from the sensor measurements, as described in (Daigle
& Kulkarni, 2013).
Battery Modeling: In order to predict end-of-discharge
(EOD) as defined by a voltage cutoff, the battery model must
compute the voltage as a function of time given the current
drawn from the battery. There are several electrochemical
processes that contribute to the cell’s potential that make this
a difficult problem. For the purposes of on-line prognos-
tics, we focus here on a lumped-parameter ordinary differ-
ential equations form that still considers the main electro-
chemical processes. We focus on Li-ion 18650 batteries with
an average nominal voltage of 4.2V and nominal capacity of
2200mAh.
The voltages of a battery are summarized in Figure 5 (adapted
from (Rahn & Wang, 2013)). The overall battery voltage
V (t) is the difference between the potential at the positive
current collector, φs(0, t), and the negative current collector,
φs(L, t), minus resistance losses at the current collectors (not
shown in the diagram). As shown in the figure, the potentials
vary with the distance d ∈ [0, L], because the loss varies with
distance from the current collectors. The details of the battery
model are discussed in (Daigle & Kulkarni, 2013).
State of Charge: State of Charge (SOC) of a battery is con-
ventionally defined to be 1 when the battery is fully charged
and 0 when the battery is fully discharged. In this model, it
is analogous to the mole fraction xn, but scaled from 0 to
1. There is a difference here between nominal SOC and ap-
parent SOC. Nominal SOC would be computed based on the
combination of the bulk and surface layer CVs in the neg-
ative electrode, whereas apparent SOC would be computed
based only on the surface layer. That is, a battery can be
discharged at a given rate, and reach the voltage cutoff, i.e.,
4
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Figure 4. Prognostics architecture (see (Daigle & Goebel, 2013))
apparent SOC is then 0. But, once the concentration gradi-
ent settles out, the surface layer will be partially replenished
and the battery can be discharged further, i.e, apparent SOC
increases whereas nominal SOC remains the same.
Nominal (n) and apparent (a) SOC can then be defined using
SOCn =
qn
0.6qmax
(1)
SOCa =
qs,n
0.6qmaxs,n
, (2)
where qmaxs,n = qmax vs,nvn . The factor 1/0.6 comes from the
fact that the mole fraction at the positive electrode cannot go
below 0.4 (Daigle & Kulkarni, 2013), therefore SOC of 1
corresponds to the point where qn = 0.6qmaxs,n .
Battery Voltage: Now that each of the voltage drops in Fig-
ure 5 have been defined, battery voltage can be expressed as
follows.
V = VU,p − VU,n − Vo − Vη,p − Vη,n. (3)
Voltages in the battery are not observed to change instanta-
neously, i.e., the voltage change occurs smoothly. When dis-
charge completes, for example, the voltage rises slowly as
the surface layers move to the concentrations of the bulk vol-
umes, as caused by diffusion. In addition to this, there are
transients associated with Vo and the Vη,i terms. To take this
into account in a simple way, we compute voltage using
V = VU,p − VU,n − V ′o − V ′η,p − V ′η,n, (4)
where
V˙ ′o = (Vo − V ′o)/τo (5)
V˙ ′η,p = (Vη,p − V ′η,p)/τη,p (6)
V˙ ′η,n = (Vη,n − V ′η,n)/τη,n, (7)
where the τ parameters are empirical time constants.
The model contains as states x, qs,p, qb,p, qb,n, qs,n, V ′o , V
′
η,p,
and V ′η,n. The single model output is V .
2.3.4. Prediction
For the batteries, we simulate for various state of charge
(SOC) values and load values the corresponding remaining
time until discharge, and compute a lookup table. Given the
Figure 5. Battery voltages.
SOC, as computed by the UKF, and expected future load, we
can then quickly compute the corresponding time of EOD.
2.3.5. Application to Prognostics
With an accurate model and known future inputs to a system,
prognostics should in turn be accurate. We use the architec-
ture described in Section 2.3. As an estimation algorithm,
we use the unscented Kalman filter (UKF) with the battery
model; see (Julier & Uhlmann, 1997, 2004) for details on
the filter and (Daigle, Saha, & Goebel, 2012; Daigle, Sax-
ena, & Goebel, 2012) for its application to prognostics. The
UKF operates on a set of deterministically selected samples,
called sigma points, that are used to represent the joint state-
parameter distribution p(x(k),θ(k)|y(k0:k)).
For the prediction algorithm, we perform a simple simulation
as described in (Daigle & Goebel, 2013). Each sigma point
is simulated forward using the model until EOD is reached;
from the corresponding EODs for each sigma point we can
construct the EOD distribution. In this work, we assume that
the future inputs (iapp) are known, so the only uncertainty
present in the prediction is that related to the model. A de-
fined cutoff voltage is assumed to define EOD.
3. APPROACH
We integrate prognostics capabilities into our R2U2 frame-
work by defining a new type of model block (Figure 6). It
is provided with the analog input signals for battery volt-
age Ubatt and current Ibatt and produces values for RUL and
5
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SOC. Prognostics blocks for other system components look
similar. The prognostics engine can also be provided with
prognosis time t, a planned load profile P , and prognostics
model M. We can use the outputs of the prognostics mod-
Prognostics
-
- -
-
6 6 6
Ubatt
Ibatt
RUL
SOC
t P M
Figure 6. R2U2 Prognostics Block
ule in different ways: a model-based accurate estimate of the
battery state at the current time. Because SOC is a statisti-
cal variable with a probability density, we use µSOCb for the
expected value and σSOC for the standard deviation. These
values [IRC: Something is missing here!!], although no pre-
dictions give more insight into the actual condition of the bat-
tery than just battery voltage.
The RUL prediction itself is calculated via ∆kE(kp). We de-
note µRULb [t,P,M] for the expected value for the battery’s
RUL in t time-stamps from now. The load-profile P can be
obtained from the flight computer by reading the list of up-
coming way-points. There can be substantial uncertainty in
the prediction because of unmodeled and unpredictable exter-
nal effects like wind. Finally, M is the battery’s prognostic
model. For convenience, we introduce µRULb [t] for a standard
expected load profile and µRULb for an RUL prediction at the
current time. Those expressions use a nominal battery model.
In the following, we discuss a number of safety and perfor-
mance properties that actively use the prognosed values of the
main battery of the UAS. Most R2U2 health models consist
of Boolean and temporal observers to monitor value ranges,
relationships, and flight rules. Value checks test whether data
values are plausible and relationships encode dependencies
among sensor or software data that may originate from differ-
ent subsystems. Flight rules are defined by institutions (e.g.,
the Federal Aviation Administration) or are rules that must be
obeyed for mission- or system-specific reasons.
3.1. Value Checks
V1: Always have enough battery.
(µSOCb > 50)
requires that the battery always has a charge of at least 50%4.
This formula continuously monitors the actual battery state
at each point in time during the flight. This threshold will
certainly vary depending on the mission profile. Such con-
straints can be easily formulated in logic. For example, a
4Note that this number has been arbritrarily chosen for illustration purposes.
loaded UAS should have its batteries charged to a minimum
of 80%: isloaded→ (µSOCb > 80). We might require that
the battery will be charged at the end of the flight tend , given
the current set of way-points P , and we want to know it now:
µRULb [tend,P]
provides this information. Note that although the formula
has a clear temporal meaning, it is not expressed in tempo-
ral logic.
V2: The above formula can be refined to monitor for safe op-
eration in specific scenarios: for a safe takeoff and subsequent
mission, the battery must be charged to at least 80%
(¬((cmd == takeoff) ∧ (µSOCb < 80))
V3: The maximum current that can be drawn from the battery
is, of course, always limited: (Ibatt < 100A). However, an
already substantially discharged battery should not be over-
burdened. For example, for the remaining 10 minutes before
the end of RUL, only 30A should be drawn. Several levels of
maximum allowable current, depending on the battery’s RUL
can be specified by:
(µRULb > 100m) ∨ Ibatt < 100A) ∨
(µRULb > 50m) ∨ Ibatt < 50A) ∨
(µRULb > 10m) ∨ Ibatt < 30A)
Here again, multiple versions with different battery models
might be of interest. A safety rule might restrict the amount
of current to be drawn even further based on a battery model
that performs predictions of an overheated battery.
V4: don’t draw too much current if you are unsure about the
charge status of the battery
(¬((σSOCb > 10) ∧ (Ieng > 50A)))
V5: Do not heat up the battery as a result of extended use
if it is close to empty. If the battery is charged to only 50%
or less, a current of more than 30A should not be drawn for
more than 30 consecutive seconds:
((µSOCb < 50)→ (Ibatt > 30A)U[0,29s](Ibatt ≤ 30A))
V6: This property monitors that the landing command is is-
sued before the battery reaches a dangerous low level of 20%
or less. Here again, the temporal operators cannot work with
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non-constant intervals, so we discretize into several ranges:
(µRULb < 1000→ ♦[0,1000](cmd == landing)) ∨
(µRULb < 500→ ♦[0,500](cmd == landing)) ∨
(µRULb < 100→ ♦[0,100](cmd == landing)) ∨
. . .
3.2. Relationships
These properties relate signals from different sensors. Here
again, rules can be different depending on the state of that
battery. For these examples and our simulation experiments,
we assume that the throttle value just regulates the motor cur-
rent Ieng , but not engine power or its speed (RPM). With
such a simple controller (mostly found in small hobby-style
UAS), the motor RPM will decrease if the battery becomes
discharged and Ubatt drops.
R1: Pitching up should result in a strong climb
([0,20s]((α > α0) ∧ (µSOCb > 80))→ ♦[0,2s]Vz > 10)
For weaker battery the available engine power is lower and
thus we cannot expect the same climb speed. We obtain
([0,20s]((α > α0) ∧ (µSOCb > 30))→ ♦[0,2s]Vz > 2)
3.3. Flight Rules
Flight rules can be complex formulas that must be valid for
the UAS to be in a safe and healthy state and to accomplish
the mission successfully. They might concern certain mini-
mal performance rules or behavior in specific situations, e.g.,
a certain loitering altitude should be reached in case the com-
munication link is lost and wait for the communication to be
re-established. Some of the flight rules depend on state of
the battery. For example, loitering should be attempted only
if the battery will have power for at least 5 more minutes of
flight. If the battery is too weak, the only safe alternative is to
immediately attempt an emergency landing.
F1: This flight rule checks on availability of enough battery
power for an upcoming climb in 10min. As discussed in Sec-
tion 1, we want to be able to decide immediately if the flight
rule is violated or not. Figure 7 shows this nominal situation
at time t. The blue line corresponds to the future development
of the altitude with a climb in 10 minutes. A naive formula-
tion in MTL as [0,10](battery == OK) is not suitable here
(green line), because the formula is false until t = t+10min.
Only then, the formula can be decided, in our nominal case,
to be true. A black triangle depicts the point when the for-
mula is decided. Even the R2U2 synchronous observer only
can obtain a “maybe” for the next 10 minutes (red line). By
using the prognostics engine, this flight rule can be encoded
as
(µRULb > 30) ∧ (tclimb − t > 10)
where tclimb is the planned time of the next climb as obtained
from the list of waypoints in the FSW. This formula can be
decided right away (magenta in Figure 7). Alternatively, this
formula can be written as µRULb [10] > 30.
t+10min
T
F
T
F
M
T
t
Figure 7. Flight rule F1
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
4.1. The UAS Testbed
For this paper, we consider a simple and small UAS plat-
form, the NASA Dragon Eye (Figure 8A). With a wingspan
of 1.1m it is small, but shares many commonalities with larger
and more complex UAS. Our R2U2 framework has been
implemented on an Adapteva Parallella board. This credit
card sized board features a Zync 7010 FPGA and is run-
ning Linux, which facilitates preprocessing of signals, run-
ning the prognostics engine, and perform data logging. For
our experiments, we also performed the BN reasoning under
Linux. Monitoring of the FSW is performed according to the
schematics shown in Figure 3. Figure 8B shows the integra-
tion of the Parallella board, located in one of the wings.
A B
Figure 8. A: Dragon Eye UAS. B: Hardware integration of
R2U2.
For the experiments presented in this paper, we used a simula-
tion environment that is based on the APM:Plane simulator5.
As shown in Figure 9 the UAS is controlled by the opera-
tor using a ground control station (GCS). The environment,
the aircraft dynamics6, motors, sensors, and the flight com-
puter is simulated in software running on a host PC. Moni-
tored FSW data are collected from the simulator and sent to
the Parallella board via a serial interface (FDTI cable), where
monitoring and diagnosis is performed. These data are also
recorded for replay purposes. Since this simulator does not
contain any suitable battery model, we are using a MACCOR
battery test stand which is able to simulate the flight path for
5http://plane.ardupilot.com
6JSBSim Flight Dynamics Model jsbsim.sourcforge.net
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JSBSim
FSW
Simulator Simul
Battery
rtR2U2
BN reasoner
Prognostics
engine
Parallella Board
host PC
GCS
Figure 9. High level system architecture with R2U2
the DragonEye. In the MACCOR we simulate the batteries
based on the path scenario in Figure 10. The data collected
from the MACCOR testbed is feed to the simulator which in
turn runs the prognostics algorithm. In our simplified setting,
battery model takes throttle position and returns current val-
ues of Ubatt and Ibatt.
4.2. Simulation experiments
In this section, we illustrate our approach with some simula-
tion experiments. Figure 10 shows a typical example. The
UAS is taking off from altitude 0 and reaching, after a short
climb, an altitude of 200ft (Figure 10, top panel). It then
flies a level course before descending to 100ft at time stamp
600. A final climb, starting at time stamp 850 brings the UAS
back to 200ft altitude. The throttle settings, necessary to ex-
ecute this profile is proportional to the battery current Ibatt
and shown in Figure 10, 2nd panel from top. The battery
voltage drops when a large current is drawn, e.g., during the
climb. During the descend, when only very little engine cur-
rent is drawn, the battery can recover and the voltage slightly
increases. Figure 10, 3rd panel from top shows Ubatt for
a fully charged battery (green) and a battery that only had
been charged to 50% (red line). With both values, the current
and the voltage, the prognostics engine calculates an RUL
for the battery at each point in time. As a safety threshold,
we use θ = 1000. Finally, the bottom panel shows the out-
put of the R2U2 unit for different formulas related to flight
rule F1: according to the flight plan, a climb will be neces-
sary at t = 850 (dashed magenta line). At time stamp 250,
we want to ask if the battery is still good to do that climb.
The top row shows the valuation of asynchronous observer
for [250,850]µRULb > θ. This formula can only become true
after the interval has been expired. The green line shows
this situation for the good battery. The RUL of weak bat-
tery, crosses the threshold at around 500 time stamps. After
that time, the formula remains false. Thus, the result of this
formula can only be used after time stamp 850, usually too
late to start any mitigation action. The second line shows the
result of the synchronous observer for the same formula. At
the beginning its value is “maybe” until the final value can be
determined: at t = 850 for the good battery and at t = 500
for the weak one. Here, this three-valued observer allows us
to obtain information earlier. The bottom lines show the val-
uation of the prognostics-based formula µRULb (850) > θ for
both scenarios. This formula is valuated immediately and the
0
100
200
altitude
0
5
Ibatt
3.2
3.6
4 Ubatt
0
1000
2000
3000
RUL
time stamp
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
F   T
FM   
T
F   T
Figure 10. Typical scenario showing illustration of al-
titude profile, Ibatt, Ubatt, µRULb , and valuations (at
t = 250) of asynchronous and synchronous observers for
[250,850]OKbatt, and µRULb (850) > 1000 for a fully
charged battery (green) and one charged to 50% (red).
Health
Behavior
Sensor
H_Laseralt
S_Laseralt S_SoC
H_Baroalt
S_Baroalt
U_Climb U_Climb_engine
C_Climb_init
Figure 11. Bayesian Network for altimeter health model
result can be used to start a necessary mitigation action earlier
than with temporal logic alone.
4.3. Prognostics for Root Cause Analysis
For this experiment we assume that the UAS is equipped with
a barometric altimeter (BA) and a laser altimeter (LA). Both
sensors measure the altitude of the aircraft but can fail in
different ways. We want to construct a probabilistic health
model to reason about the health of these sensors.
Our BN model in Figure 11 does not reason about actual al-
titude measurements but rather uses an abstracted indication
of increasing or decreasing altitude, noted as UP and DOWN.
Observable sensor nodes for BA and LA (Figure 11 bottom,
left) are clamped to these values based upon the information
extracted from the flight software. The health of each of the
sensors is reflected in the nodes H Laseralt and H Baroalt
with states GOOD and BAD (Figure 11 top).
The priors of these nodes indicate the reliability of each of
the sensors (see below). Each of the sensors should mea-
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Table 1. CPT Table for BN in Figure 11
A H Baroalt GOOD BAD
U Climb UP DOWN UP DOWN
S Baroalt=UP 1 0 0.5 0.5
S Baroalt=DOWN 0 1 0.5 0.5
B U Climb engine UP UP
S SoC=High 0.85 0.15
S SoC=Low 0.5 0.5
sure the same entity and thus should show the same behavior
with respect to UAS climbs and descents. This is modeled by
the unobservable behavior node U climb, which influences
both sensors. If both sensors show the same behavior (e.g.,
UP,UP), the sensors are most likely healthy. Divergent be-
havior might indicate a problem with either sensor. Table 1A
shows the CPT for BA sensor node S Baroalt (the CPT table
for the LA sensor has the same structure). The CPT table de-
notes that a healthy sensor follows the climb behavior (center
columns). If the sensor is broken, however, probabilities are
0.5, so nothing can be deduced (right columns).
We now need to address the question on how to find the root
cause with divergent sensor readings. In our model, we pull
in additional information related to climb or descend behavior
of the UAS. This behavior is, in particular, related to the ques-
tion whether an engine-induced climb is happening. This be-
havior U Climb engine is unobservable as well. An engine-
induced climb can only happen if a climb command has been
initiated by the FSW (C Climb init is set to UP). In addi-
tion, the current state of the battery plays an important role: if
the battery is fully charged (S SoC is HIGH), a commanded
climb will result in the aircraft gaining altitude, something
that cannot be guaranteed when the battery is already weak.
Here, we need to use probabilistic reasoning, because other
effects like down-drafts can play a major role. The CPT
for this node is shown in Table 1B. A good battery will re-
sult in a climb in 85% of the cases: p(U climb engine =
UP|S SoC = HIGH) = 0.85. A weak battery is modeled as
p(U climb engine = UP|S SoC = LOW) = 0.5. Note that
there is also an edge connecting S SoC with H Laseralt. This
edge models the effect that the LA might be less reliable and
accurate when the battery is weak. In our model, the BA is
reliable to 95%, whereas the LA is only 90% reliable if the
battery is good. Otherwise, the probability for a healthy LA
drops to 0.6.7
Figure 12 shows the BN in a number of different situations.
Observable nodes are colored red for DOWN and LOW, and
green for UP and HIGH, respectively. The marginal proba-
bilities of the behavior and health nodes are shaded in dif-
ferent levels of grey, where white indicates a probability of
one. In a nominal scenario (Figure 11) with sensor input con-
sistent to climbing, both sensors appear to be healthy. Fig-
7The probabilities used in this example have been selected for illustration
purposes only.
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Figure 12. Bayesian Network for altimeter health model in
various scenarios. See text for details.
ure 12A shows a nominal situation when the UAS is descend-
ing. Note that both unobservable behavior nodes now have
status DOWN with high probability. A failing barometric al-
timeter can be detected easily as such during descending (Fig-
ure 12B) and climbing (Figure 12C) when the battery is fresh.
If we get the same altitude sensor readings, but the battery is
weak (Figure 12D), a different picture emerges: the model is
aware that commanded climbs with a weak battery often do
not result in an increasing altitude, because the engine doesn’t
receive enough power. In addition, the LA is less reliable with
a weak battery. Therefore, the BN reasons that, despite two
other disagreeing sources, the BA is most likely in a better
shape than the LA.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented the integration of prognostics rea-
soning into the R2U2 temporal and Bayesian health manage-
ment framework. We used a UKF-based prognostics engine
to provide SOC and RUL prognoses for the battery of a UAS.
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This information can be used in the R2U2 model to improve
diagnostic accuracy. Most notably, prognostic information
allows the monitor to instantaneously evaluate at the present
time step the properties dealing with events in the future (e.g.,
a climb in 10 minutes). Temporal logic observers can only
do that valuation at the end of the time interval, or only pro-
vide minimal information (maybe). Thus, statistically reli-
able health information is available at a much earlier time, a
capability that is very valuable for safe autonomous decision
making.
The presented work is only a first step toward full integration.
Future work will investigate how the probability densities of
the prognostics outputs can be directly used by a Bayesian
network with sensor nodes capable of handling discretized
probability density functions. Also the use of multiple mod-
els for nominal and off-nominal battery conditions and fault
progression might improve fault detection and diagnostic rea-
soning in advanced R2U2 health models. Furthermore, we
will aim to implement the prognostics engine in FPGA hard-
ware (see e.g., (Soh & Wu, 2014) for a possible approach).
For monitoring safety and performance of a UAS, we would
also like to evaluate the usefulness of information from other
components of the UAS (e.g. engine, or other structural com-
ponents) as well as environmental effects (e.g., icing) or oper-
ational performance (e.g., reliability of a radio link in differ-
ent weather conditions) for prognosis. Such additional infor-
mation might be amenable to prognostic modeling and sub-
sequent integration into R2U2 health models.
NOMENCLATURE
µRULb mean of RUL for battery
σRULb std of RUL for battery
µSoCb mean of SoC for battery
σSoCb std of SoC for battery
Vz vertical velocity
SOC state of charge of battery [%]
RUL remaining useful life
EOD End of Discharge
EOL End of Life
H X BN health node for component X
U BN behavior node
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